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COMMENTS
DISCOVERY OF OPINION WORK PRODUCT IN
ILLINOIS: TOWARD DEFINING THE
PARAMETERS OF
CONSOLIDATION COAL
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of pretrial discovery is to promote full disclosure of relevant factual material so as to increase the probability
'of a just decision on the merits of the case.' Liberal discovery
procedures developed as an alternative to "the procedural doctrines which have exalted the role of a trial as a battle of wits
and subordinated its function as a means of ascertaining the
1. The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device
...to narrow and classify the basic issues between the parties, and
(2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the exist-

ence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials
in the federal courts no longer need to be carried on in the dark. The
way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties
to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation .... The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which disclosure can be compelled from
the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility
of surprise.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947).
"[B]y 'educating the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of
their claims and defenses' the ascertainment of the truth and the ultimate
disposition of the lawsuit in accordance therewith is expedited." Monier v.
Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1966) (quoting People ex
rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.
2d 231, 236, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1957)).
The facilitation of pretrial settlement is often stated as a corollary purpose of discovery. If all the factual information relevant to a party's claim
or defense is known in advance of trial, the party will be better able to evaluate the value of the case, thereby leading to a settlement, which avoids
costly litigation and relieves the pressure on crowded court dockets.
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 357, 221 N.E.2d 410, 415 (1966); People
2d 231, 239, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592-93 (1957).
ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.
For an analysis of both the purposes of discovery and criticisms of the
assumed benefits, see Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and FederalCourts, 15
J. MAR.L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Johnston]; Comment, Discovery and the Work Product Doctrine, 11 Loy. U. CHI. LJ.863 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Discovery and Work Product]; Developments in the LawDiscovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940 (1961).
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truth. '2 To the extent that liberal discovery has replaced the
pleadings as a means of narrowing issues and uncovering facts,
it is an improvement in our adversary system of litigation. 3 The
need to protect an attorney's privacy in the preparation for litigation, so as to promote effective presentation of the client's
case, 4 clashes with the purpose of pretrial discovery. This conflict intensifies as discovery attempts to reach not only relevant
factual information developed in preparation for litigation, but
also pretrial materials which necessarily contain the mental impressions and trial strategy of opposing counsel.5 Such an intrusion strikes at the heart of the adversary system which assumes
independent preparation and diligent presentation of6 the relevant facts to the court by both sides to a controversy.
2. Krupp v. Chicago Transit Auth., 8 Ill. 2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 535
(1956). See also Pink v. Dempsey, 350 Ill. App. 405, 411, 113 N.E.2d 334, 336
(1956) ("Pretrial discovery ... is directed toward making the judicial process one of determining the facts appertaining to the issue and rendering a
just decision thereon, rather than the promotion of a battle of wits between
counsel."); Johnston, supra note 1, at 3 (pretrial discovery is a rejection of
the "sporting theory" of litigation); Note, Monier v. Chamberlain: Work
Product-FurtherErosion of the Work ProductSanctuary, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC.
&PROC. 146, 148 (1967) (sporting theory of justice no longer a serious argument against pretrial discovery) [hereinafter cited as Erosion of Work
Product].
3. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). Prior to the establishment of pretrial discovery mechanisms, "the pretrial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and
inadequately by the pleadings." Id. See generally Johnston, supra note 1;
Erosion of Work Product,supra note 2.
4. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) ("Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files
and mental impressions of an attorney.").
5. For an excellent analysis of the opposing interests of discovery and
the adversary system from the perspective of the work product doctrine,
see Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333, 334-36 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Protection of Opinion Work Product].
6. Work product which contains an attorney's mental impressions and
opinions is frequently referred to as the core of work product. That is, the
very heart of an attorney's role in the adversary system is the application of
his special knowledge and expertise for the benefit of the client in preparation for trial, which generates certain strategies, opinions and conclusions
with respect to evidence and witnesses. The attorney's expertise will also
be used in gathering relevant evidence for trial, but the material gathered
will be based in part upon the attorney's strategies and conclusions. Therefore, work product which reveals the mental processes of an attorney is at
the core of trial preparation materials. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 238 (1975); Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REV.
1269, 1283 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper]; Protectionof Opinion Work
Product,supra note 5, at 333; Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery of Experts' and Attorneys' Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1145, 1155-56 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Ambiguities].
The adversary system assumes that bilateral preparation and presentation is the primary force in ascertaining the truth in a controversy. Only by
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This competition between the interests of pretrial discovery
and the interests of the adversary system has necessitated a balancing of these interests to allow equal access to relevant information while preserving the essential nature of the adversary
system. 7 This balancing, in its various forms, has come to be
known loosely as the work product doctrine.
The Development of the Work Product Doctrine
Although the work product doctrine had its origin in the
common law, Hickman v. Taylor8 was the seminal case in developing the doctrine in its present form. In that case, the United
States Supreme Court recognized a qualified immunity from
discovery for the work product of an attorney. 9 According to the
Court, work product includes "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions [and] personal beliefs" generated by an attorney preparing for
litigation.' 0 The protection afforded by the Court, however, is
not absolute;" only if the party who seeks discovery can show
that the work-product materials are essential to his case is dis12
covery permitted.
The Hickman decision outlined several practical considerations which support the qualified immunity. Allowing free acdiligent two-sided preparation and presentation of all the facts is the necessary "friction" which generates the truth produced. Any procedure which
interferes with a party's preparation of the case, such as the discovery of
trial preparation materials, reduces the necessary adversary position and
self-interest of the parties, thus impairing the judicial search for the truth.
Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 5, at 334. But see Comment, The Potentialfor Discovery of Opinion Work Product Under Rule
26(b) (3), 64 IowA L. REV. 103, 113-14 (1978) (protection of the adversary system provides a weak basis for supporting work product protection) [hereinafter cited as Potentialfor Discovery of Opinion Work Product].
7. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries"). See also Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1, at 863; Protectionof Opinion Work
Product,supra note 5, at 333.
8. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
9. Id. at 511.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. For a discussion of work product protection prior to Hickman
and the development of the Hickman doctrine, see generally Note, Discovery of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DUKE L.J.
799, 801-05 [hereinafter cited as Work Product in Subsequent Litigation];
Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1, at 868-69; Note, SEC v. International Student Marketing Corp., Work ProductImmunity Inapplicableto At-

torney-Defendant Where Work Product Is At Issue and Former Client Is No
Longer an Interested Party in the Suit, 6 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 447, 449-51 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Work Product Immunity]; Note, The Implications of
Upjohn, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 887, 897 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Implications of Upjohn] ,Ambiguities, supra note 6, at 1152-56.
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cess to opposing counsel's work product, thus allowing one
attorney to rely on the efforts of another, would deter written
preparation and would discourage the attorney whose fies are
invaded from using his or her best efforts in representing the
client.' 3 Free access to work product would result in
"[i] nefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices... in the giving
of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial."'14 The
legal profession would be "demoralized" and clients "poorly
5
served."'
The Hickman decision is also responsible for formulating
the distinction between ordinary and opinion work product.
Opinion work product consists of materials generated in anticipation of litigation which reveal the mental impressions, opinions, or trial strategy of an attorney. 16 An example is
memoranda prepared by an attorney which reflect his personal
and professional evaluation of a prospective witness.' 7 Ordinary work product encompasses relevant factual material developed for trial which does not disclose such "conceptual data."' 8
13. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 511.
14. Id.
15. Id. Some commentators have questioned the practical significance
of the factors outlined in Hickman which support work product protection.
See Cooper, supra note 6, at 1276-82; Potentialfor Discovery of Opinion
Work Product, supra note 6, at 113-16.

16. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 512 ("But as to oral statements made
by witnesses ...whether presently in the form of his mental impressions
or memoranda, we do not believe that any showing of necessity can be
made under the circumstances ... to justify production."). Accord Upjohn

Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981) (discussing the special Hickman protection for opinion work product); Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill.
2d
351, 360, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1966) (opinion work product includes an attorney's impression of a prospective witness, trial briefs, documents marshalling evidence for trial, and any documents or materials made in preparation
for trial which reveal the attorney's "mental processes").
17. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 360, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1966).
18. Id. The problem of defining the scope of trial preparation materials
has resulted in diverse views in the federal courts. The federal rules and
the Illinois rules both require that materials, to qualify for work product
protection, must be prepared in "anticipation of litigation." See FED. R. CIv.
P. 26(b)(3); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(b)(2) (1981) (ILL. SuP. CT. R.
201(b) (2)).
The courts and commentators have proposed several definitions of "anticipation of litigation." See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979) (some possibility of litigation must exist); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1978) (work product
protection does not apply to documents prepared where there is only a remote possibility of litigation); Harper &Row Pub., Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d
487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970) (materials prepared with an eye toward litigation),
aOfd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 955 (1971); Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D. Ga. 1977) ("substantial probability that
litigation will occur and that commencement of such litigation is imminent"); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(threat of litigation is "real and imminent"). See also 4 J. MOORE &J. LuCAS,

19821

Opinion Work Product

Examples are a verbatim statement of a prospective witness 19
and photographs of an accident site.20 Under the Hickman rule,
ordinary work product is discoverable upon showing that the
material sought is essential to the case, but opinion work product is discoverable, if at all, only in "rare situation [s] .,21
The Hickman opinion is not a model of clarity or certainty,
and federal courts have come to disparate conclusions as to the
scope of the protection. The courts had problems both in determining the requisite showing for discovery of ordinary work
product, 22 and in determining the discoverability of opinion
work product.23 These problems led the Illinois Supreme Court,
in 1966, to formulate a unique approach to protection of attorney
work product.
Work Product in Illinois
In Monier v. Chamberlain,24 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the Hickman protection of ordinary work product. The
court felt that requiring a showing of substantial need or "good
cause" before permitting discovery of work product had led "to a
FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.63, at 26-349 (2d ed. 1981) (litigation must
have been "reasonably" anticipated or apprehended) [hereinafter cited as

MOORE's

8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIvIL § 2024, at 198 (1970) ("in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to
have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation")
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the work product
issue in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Court held
that the work product doctrine applied to an Internal Revenue summons
seeking information about questionable payments to foreign officials. Id. at
397. Noticeably absent from the decision is any discussion of the anticipation of litigation requirement of Rule 26(b) (3). One commentator has taken
the position that in a case, such as Upjohn, of questionable payments to
foreign governments the Court would hold that litigation could be assumed.
J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
503(b) [04], at 503-56.2 (1975). See
also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979)
(questionable payments by corporation raised possibility of litigation, so
J. MOORE];

work product protection applied to corporate attorney's investigation
materials).
19. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 IIl. 2d 351, 360, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1966).
20. Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1, at 881.
21. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947). "Where relevant and
non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential, discovery may properly be had ....
But as
to oral statements made by witnesses ... whether in the form of [the attorney's] mental impressions or memoranda," discovery would only be had in
a rare situation. Id. at 511-12.
22. Ambiguities, supra note 6, at 1156-57.
23. See infra notes 36, 46 &53 and accompanying text. See also Ambiguities, supra note 6, at 1156-57.
24. 35 IM.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).

54
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huge jungle of conflicting decisions. ' 25 Moreover, the "good
cause" standard required too great a degree of judicial intervention into the discovery process. The court observed that under
Illinois practice discovery is meant to be self-executing with the
26
impetus to proceed supplied by the parties to the dispute.
Thus, the court held that ordinary work product would be freely
discoverable.2 7 While the court was cognizant that the Illinois
rule would "occasionally penalize diligent counsel and reward
his slothful adversary," it held that the ascertainment of the
truth and the expeditious disposition of the litigation overrode
these considerations. 28 The Monier court, however, agreed with
the Hickman decision that opinion work product should be af25. Id. at 361, 221 N.E.2d at 417.
26. Id. at 357, 221 N.E.2d at 415. Accord Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 432 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982) (Illinois discovery
procedures contemplate that discovery will procede without judicial intervention); Williams v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 83 Ill. 2d 559, 563, 416 N.E.2d 252,
254 (1981) ("discovery will generally proceed without judicial intervention
and... the great majority of discovery questions will be resolved by counsel themselves").
27. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d at 361, 221 N.E.2d at 417.
28. Id. The Monier decision was the culmination of a series of cases
which had gradually eroded what had once been absolute immunity for all
trial preparation materials. Discovery and Work Product, supra note 1, at
875. Prior to Monier, the Illinois Supreme Court began to create exceptions
to the absolute protection for all work product. First, the court held that
names and addresses of prospective witnesses could not be withheld under
a claim of work product protection. Krupp v. Chicago Transit Auth., 8 Ill. 2d
37, 42, 132 N.E.2d 532, 536 (1956). Later, the court held that the material and
evidentiary facts that would be independently admissible at trial are not
protected by the work product doctrine. Stimpert v. Abdnour, 24 Ill. 2d 26,
31, 179 N.E.2d 602, 605 (1962). The Illinois appellate courts had likewise begun to formulate exceptions to work product protection. One court, relying
on Stimpert, held that a witness' statement gathered in preparation for trial
was not exempt from discovery under the work product doctrine.
Oberkircher v. Chicago Transit Auth., 41 111. App. 2d 68, 77, 190 N.E.2d 170,
173 (1963). Another court held that reports to an attorney about the prior
condition of a gas main, which exploded and gave rise to the litigation, were
not protected work product. Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 61,
199 N.E.2d 802, 807 (1964). In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee proposed a new work product rule which incorporated the exceptions created in the case law. See 53 ILL. B.J. 572 (1965). Monier did away
with the need to adopt the proposed rule by holding all ordinary work product freely discoverable.
This aspect of the Monier decision met with criticism, but was also
praised in some commentary. Compare Watson, The Settlement Theory of
Discovery, 55 ILL. B.J. 480 (1967) and Erosion of Work Product,supra note 2,
with Philips, Anti-Monierism, 55 ILL. B.J. 920 (1967). The drafters of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules attempted to eliminate the possibility of one attorney relying on the efforts of his opponent by allowing the trial judge to
apportion the costs of discovery. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 201(b) (2) (1981)
(ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b) (2)). See also Discovery and Work Product,supra
note 1, at 899-900. Cf. Cooper, supra note 6, at 1331-33 (while not referring to
Monier specifically, the article comes to a conclusion similar to the Illinois
work product rule).
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forded greater protection, and held that such work product is absolutely exempt from discovery. 29 This privilege-like exemption
remained the rule in Illinois for sixteen years.
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. ,3o the Illinois
Supreme Court again addressed the scope of work product protection in Illinois. The court modified the Monier standard of
absolute protection to allow for discovery of opinion work product where procuring the information from other sources is absolutely impossible. 3 1 The court declined to elaborate any further.
This lack of guidance may lead the Illinois courts to look to other
jurisdictions, especially the federal courts, in determining the
parameters of the new rule. A critical analysis of Consolidation
Coal is necessary to determine the questions left unanswered
by the decision. An attempt will be made to set out a framework
within which the Illinois courts may work to determine the
boundaries of the exception.
DISCOVERY OF OPINION WORK PRODUCT: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF HICKMAN V. TAYLOR

AND RULE 26(b) (3)
In 1970, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended to reflect the Hickman work product rule, and to clarify the standard of protection for attorney work product. 32 The
amended rule, 26(b) (3), creates a clearer distinction between
ordinary and opinion work product with regard to their discover29. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d at 361, 221 N.E.2d at 417. The codified version of the Illinois work product rule states:
Privilege and Work Product

Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is subject to
discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(b)(2) (1981) (ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b) (2)).
The majority of states have adopted the federal rule with little variation. See, e.g., ARiz. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3); COLO. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3); DEL. CT.
COMM. PLEAS Crv. R. 26(b)(3); IDAHO R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3); IND. R. TRIAL P.
26(b)(2); MASS. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3); ME. R. Crv. P. 400; MINN. R. CIv. P.

26.02(3); N.D.R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3); Omo R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3); WASH. SUPER. CT.
Crv. R. 26(b) (3); Wyo. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3). Texas grants absolute immunity
to all work product materials. See TEx. R. Crv. P. 186a. In 1978, Pennsylvania amended its work product rule to protect only opinion work prod-

uct, thus joining Illinois in allowing the free discoverability of ordinary
work product. See PA. R. Cirv. P. 4003.3. For a discussion of the various state
approaches to work product protection, see Comment, Texas Work Product

Protection: Time For A Change, 15 Hous. L. REV. 112 (1977).
30. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982).
31. Id. at 111, 432 N.E.2d at 253.
32. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CiIL PROCEDURE
RELATING TO DISCOVERY, ADVISORY COMMrIrEE COMMENTS, 48 F.R.D. 487,
499-502 (1970).
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ability.33 Ordinary work product is discoverable upon a showing
of substantial need and undue hardship in obtaining the materials from other sources. 34 The rule, however, is not clear as to the
standard of protection to be afforded to opinion work product,
and states only that "the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney ... concerning the litigation.

' ' 35

Reacting to Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3), the federal courts
developed various guidelines to determine when, if ever, opinion
work product is discoverable. Three distinct approaches have
emerged: (1) absolute immunity, (2) the "at issue" and crime or
fraud exceptions, and (3) the balancing approach.
Absolute Immunity
Several federal courts have determined that opinion work
product should be absolutely exempt from the discovery process. 36 The courts have reasoned that the considerations outlined in Hickman 37 and Rule 26(b) (3) of the Federal Rules both
33. Rule 26(b) (3) states:
Trial Preparation:Materials
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things...
prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for that other party's representative ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that
he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). The Court in Upjohn held that Rule 26(b)(3) sets up different standards of protection for ordinary and opinion work product. Documents and
tangible things which do not reveal an attorney's mental processes are discoverable upon showing substantial need and undue hardship. No showing
of the substantial need and undue hardship contemplated by the rule, however, would be sufficient to compel production of opinion work product material. A far stronger showing of need would have to be demonstrated by
the party seeking discovery. Id. at 400-02.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

35. Id. See also Potential For Discovery of Opinion Work Produc
supra note 6, at 113; Ambiguities, supra note 6, at 1156-57.
36. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509
F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412
F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also WRIGHT & MLER, supra note 18, at
§ 2026 (1970 & Supp. 1981); PotentialFor Discovery of Opinion Work Product,
supra note 6, at 113-14; Protectionof Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at
337-40.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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38
require absolute immunity. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
the Eighth Circuit held that opinion work product is absolutely
protected from discovery. 39 The decision is clearly based on the
distinction in Hickman between ordinary work product and
40
work product which reflects an attorney's mental impressions.
Implicit in the decision is the court's concern that the dangers to
the adversary system which would ensue from allowing discovery of work product are even more pronounced with respect to
41
opinion work product.

The Fourth Circuit, in Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz,42 granted absolute immunity for opinion work
product on a much clearer analysis. According to that court,
Rule 26(b) (3) of the Federal Rules commanded courts to protect
opinion work product absolutely, as opposed to ordinary work
product which could, in some instances, be discovered. 43 The
court also felt that the possibility of fostering sharp practices
and inefficiency compelled absolute protection from discovery
for opinion work product. Furthermore, the court feared that
discovery of opinion work product, in any instance, would discourage written preparation for trial;" if opinion work product
truth
remained unwritten, clients would be poorly served and
'45
would be "lost in the murky recesses of the memory.
38. 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973). In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the
government sought to compel the disclosure of summaries of interviews
with nonemployees conducted by an attorney for the corporation.
39. Id. at 848.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 362 (2d ed. 1970)).
The Eighth Circuit, however, in In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977),
recognized a limited crime or fraud exception to the protection of opinion
work product. Id. at 338. The Murphy case suggests a retreat from the

court's holding in Grand Jury Proceedings that opinion work product is absolutely protected. See supra text accompanying note 39. On the crime or
fraud exception, see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
42. 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).

43. Id. at 734.
44. Id. at 736.
45. Id. The Duplan court's holding has been criticized for several reasons. One argument is that the history of Rule 26(b) (3) does not support
absolute immunity from discovery. In 1946, the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure proposed an amendment to the rules which would
have granted absolute immunity to opinion work product. The proposed
rule stated: 'The court shall not order the production or inspection of any
part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories .... ." REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO RULES OF CIvIL, PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED

STATES, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457 (1946). The amendment was never adopted. The
1970 amendment to Rule 26 requires only that the court "shall protect"
against the disclosure of opinion work product. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b).(3). If
the drafters of Rule 26(b) (3) had wanted to grant absolute protection to
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The "At Issue" and Crime or FraudExceptions
Several courts have refused to adopt an absolute immunity
for opinion work product. Rather, these courts have developed
certain well-defined exceptions to an otherwise strict protection
of opinion work product. 46 In Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &

Johnson,47 the court recognized the "at issue" exception to the
almost absolute protection of opinion work product. The plaintiff brought an antitrust action claiming that the defendant had
instituted a series of patent infringement suits against it in bad
faith as part of a conspiracy to restrain trade. The plaintiff
sought access to the litigation files of the attorneys who had represented the defendant in the prior patent suits in order to learn
those attorneys' opinions about the validity of the patents in the
earlier litigation. 48 The defendant resisted discovery on the
ground that the requested documents were opinion work prodopinion work product, such an intention could have been more explicitly
stated. Protectionof Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 338-39.
The Duplan court's reference to Hickman as supporting absolute immunity has little substance. The Hickman Court did not rule that opinion

work product is absolutely immune from discovery, but rather held that
only in rare circumstances would production be justified. See supra text
accompanying note 21. Thus the Hickman decision does not require absolute immunity, but rather only requires greater protection for opinion work
product materials. Protectionof Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 339.
See also Potentialfor Discovery of Opinion Work Product, supra note 6, at
110; Ambiguities, supra note 6, at 1162.
The Duplan decision also seems to recognize the limited "at issue" exception to an otherwise strict protection of opinion work product. The court

cited with approval Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1973),

which held that "a party cannot affirmatively assert reliance upon an attorney's advice and then refuse to disclose such advice." Duplan, 509 F.2d at
735. For a discussion of the "at issue" exception, see infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
The Fourth Circuit also favorably discussed the crime or fraud exception to work product protection. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540
F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Protectionof Opinion Work Product,
supra note 5, at 338 n.38.
46. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977) (crime or fraud
exception); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
("at issue" exception), aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
102 Sup. Ct. 658 (1981). American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D.
706 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (crime or fraud exception); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("at issue" exception); Truck

Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
("at issue" exception); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 18 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1302 (D.D.C. 1974) ("at issue" exception); Bird v. Penn
Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("at issue" exception); Kearney &
Trecker Corp. v. Giddings &Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Wis. 1969)
("at issue" exception). See also J. MOORE, supra note 18, 26.64(4] at 26-447

(2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1981-82); PotentialforDiscovery of Opinion Work Prod-

uct, supra note 6; Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1, at 874, 896-97;
Work ProductImmunity, supra note 12; Implications of Upjohn, supra note

12, at 898-99; Protection of Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 341-44.
47. 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
48. Id. at 928.
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uct and thus absolutely protected. The court disagreed and held
that the files were discoverable. 49 The court based its conclusion on the fact that the attorney's opinion of the validity of the
prior patents was directly at issue in the plaintiff's claim. The
only proof on the issue of validity was contained in the work
product of the defendant's attorneys. The court held that where
the information sought is "directly at issue, and the need for its
50
production is compelling," production will be ordered.
The crime or fraud exception is similar to the "at issue" exception. If the crime or fraud of the party opposing discovery is
the basis of the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery,
and if proof of the crime or fraud cannot be obtained from any
other source, the opinion work product containing such information is discoverable.5 ' In In re Murphy,5 2 the court developed a
two-pronged test which the party seeking discovery had to meet
before production would be compelled: (1) the client must be
engaged in or planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme when he
seeks the advice of an attorney to further the scheme; and
(2) the opinion work product must bear a "close relationship" to
53
the client's scheme to commit a crime or fraud.
The Balancing Approach
Several courts have read Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3) to require balancing the need of the party seeking disclosure and the
attorney's privacy.5 4 In Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp.,55 the court
49. Id. at 931.
50. Id. at 933.
51. See Protectionof Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 343 & n.64.
See also In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976); American Standard, Inc. v. Ben-

dix Corp., 80 F.R.D. 706
52. 560 F.2d 326 (8th
titrust and fraud action
bution of tetracycline

(W.D. Mo. 1978).
Cir. 1977). The Murphy litigation arose from an analleging a monopoly in the manufacture and distriagainst several pharmaceutical companies. The

government contended that the companies involved had defrauded the U.S.
Patent Office by withholding important information concerning the tetracycline patents. The government sought discovery of documents from prior
patent infringement suits which involved the manufacturers. The court
held that the government had failed to make a primafacie showing that the
manufacturers had defrauded the Patent Office, and thus the exception was
not available to compel the production of the documents in question. Id. at
339. See PotentialforDiscovery of Opinion Work Product, supra note 6, for

a discussion and analysis of the Murphy decision.

53. 560 F.2d at 338.
54. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979);
Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by an

equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64
F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); International Tel. &Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co.,
60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See also Discovery and Work Product,supra
note 1, at 874; Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 5, at 344-45.
55. 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For the facts of the Xerox case, see
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held that Hickman called for the protection of an attorney's
opinion work product when feasible, "but not at the expense of
hiding non-privileged facts from adversaries or the court. Thus,
the right of privacy of an attorney's notes must be balanced
'56
against the critical need for the facts.
A variant of the balancing approach has developed in a few
courts which hold that, as the quantity of opinion work product
in a document increases, the requirement of substantial need
increases proportionately. A representative case is Harper &
Row Publishers,Inc. v. Decker,5 7 where the court held that "the
less the lawyer's 'mental processes' are involved, the less will be
the burden to show good cause."5' 8
infra text accompanying notes 127-29.
56. 64 F.R.D. at 381.
57. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971).
58. Id. at 492. The court refused to compel the disclosure of interview
memoranda even though six years had passed since the interviews were
conducted, and even though, as the court conceded, memories would dim
over that long a period of time, making the witnesses' later depositions subject to inaccuracies. Id.
The balancing approach has been criticized for several reasons. One
commentator has argued that the discretion of the trial judge is too great in
balancing the interests of privacy and disclosure. This wide discretion
could lead to erratic and uncertain protection. The attorneys' uncertainty
about the protection could deter written preparation and lead to poorlyrepresented clients. Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 5, at
344-45.
Another commentator has labeled the balancing approach the "one-dimensional" approach to work product protection. That is, the courts which
use the balancing rationale fail to distinguish the differing standards of protection for opinion work product embodied in Rule 26(b) (3) and Hickman.
The commentator points out that the recent Supreme Court decision in
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), clearly acknowledges the
distinction, and is thus a rejection of this one-dimensional approach. Implications of Upjohn, supra note 12, at 900-01. While these criticisms have
some merit, a closer analysis of some of the instances in which the balancing approach has been used reveals that the courts which use the approach
are nevertheless giving greater protection to opinion work product than to
ordinary work product materials. Those courts which have allowed discovery seem to be describing the rare situations contemplated by the Hickman
decision. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d
Cir. 1979) (memoranda from attorney interview with now-deceased witness,
which could contain opinion work product, is discoverable because of the
"stark inability" of the government to procure the information from other
sources); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(facts critical to a party's case, which are uniquely within the knowledge of
a witness who has failed to remember the essential facts at deposition, are
discoverable by producing opinion work product in the form of interview
memoranda because of the "total inability" to obtain those facts from other
sources). See also infra text accompanying notes 124-27, 129-31.
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Opinion Work Product Intertwined With Ordinary
Work Product
The several different approaches to discovery of opinion
work product reflect the frequent problem of opinion work product existing in the same document with relevant factual information developed by the attorney. The Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 26(b) (3) allow a court, where feasible, to excise
opinion work product from the document to allow discovery of
the factual material upon a showing of substantial need and un59
due hardship in procuring the information from other sources.
The more difficult problem arises when the opinion work product cannot be excised without destroying the value of the document to the party seeking discovery. The courts which
absolutely protect opinion work product would be likely to bar
disclosure. 60 The courts which recognize the narrow "at issue"
exception or crime or fraud exception would probably allow dis61
covery if the opinion work product fit within the exceptions.
The courts which balance the need for discovery with the need
the need to obtain the
for protection would allow discovery if 62
material was critical to the party's case.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the ambiguities of
Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3), and the different conclusions and
59. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOVERY, ADVISORY COMMrrrEE COMMENTS, 48 F.R.D.
487, 502 (1970). See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at § 2026 (1970 &
Supp. 1982).
60. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d
730, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1974) (court may excise opinion work product, but must
take care to protect against disclosure of such work product). See also Protection of Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 340.
61. None of the courts which recognize the exceptions have dealt with
the excising problem. Cf Protection of Opinion Work Product,supra note
5, at 346 (commentator proposed amendment to Rule 26(b) (3) which would
protect opinion work product unless it fits within the two exceptions).
62. See Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The holding in Xerox is quite remarkable because it would allow the production of opinion work product in the form of interview memoranda,
where excising is not feasible, so long as the substantial need and undue
hardship criteria are met.
A literal reading of Xerox would yield the conclusion that the court
would give opinion work product which can be excised greater protection
than that given to opinion work product which cannot be excised. See Protection of Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 341. The Xerox holding
also seems contrary to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981), which require that a far stronger showing of
necessity and undue hardship would have to be demonstrated in order to
compel the disclosure of opinion work product than is necessary to compel
discovery of ordinary work product. See also supra text accompanying note
21. But see supra note 58 (Xerox case demonstrates rare situation contemplated by Hickman and Upjohn where opinion work product would be
discoverable).
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approaches which can be justified under the federal work product rule. 63 The Illinois Supreme Court, in Monier, avoided this
result by simply declaring ordinary work product discoverable
and opinion work product absolutely exempt from discovery.
Absolute exemption, however, may by its inflexibility work injustice and frustrate the fair disposition of litigation in some circumstances. 64 The Illinois Supreme Court realized this problem
after reviewing documents which contained opinion work product in ConsolidationCoal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. 65 The court's
attempt to create a narrow exception to the otherwise absolute
immunity is commendable, but may give rise to problems of interpretation in Illinois (much like the disparate results in the
federal courts which followed Hickman), as the state trial courts
struggle to set the bounds of discovery. Moreover, the decisions
in the federal courts will undoubtedly be looked to by the Illinois courts in their attempt to define the parameters of the ConsolidationCoal decision.
THE CONSOLIDATION COAL CASE

Facts and ProceduralHistory
In January, 1977, Consolidation Coal Co. (Consol) brought
an action against Bucyrus-Erie Co. (B-E) in the circuit court of
Cook County to recover damages sustained when a wheel excavator collapsed at one of Consol's coal mines. The wheel excavator was designed, manufactured, and repaired for Consol by
B-E. Consol commenced discovery and filed a production request for all of B-E's documents relating to the excavator, including documents relating to B-E's investigation of the
63. Recently, in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the
United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the scope of
opinion work product protection under Rule 26(b) (3), but refused to do so.
Instead, the Court referred to the Hickman decision and stated in dictum
that, at the least, "a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by
other means" than is required to discover ordinary work product would be
necessary to compel disclosure of opinion work product. Id. at 401-02.
Upjohn, in effect, has left the ambiguities unresolved and the formulation of
standards to the lower courts. Concededly, the main thrust of the Upjohn

opinion dealt with attorney-client privilege for corporate employees, and
the Court was asked'to decide only if work product protection extended to
Internal Revenue Service summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Id. at
397. As to the effect of the Upjohn holding on work product protection for
corporate employee interviews, see infra note 81.
64. See Discovery and Work Product, supra note 1, at 902, 904. See also
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 111, 432 N.E.2d 250,

253 (1982) (recognizing the need to create a narrow exception to the otherwise absolute protection of opinion work product because of situations
where a party might not be able to obtain critical facts from other sources).
65. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982).
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excavator's collapse. 66 B-E produced thousands of documents,
but refused to produce a metallurgical report,67 another report
prepared by its director of engineering, 68 and memoranda and
notes of interviews with various B-E employees prepared by inhouse counsel. 69 B-E based its refusal on the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine. 70 After an in camera
inspection, the trial court ordered B-E to produce the documents in question except for certain deleted portions which the
trial court ruled were work product, 71 and the engineering director's report which was exempted by the attorney-client
72
privilege.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court with
some modifications. 73 The court held that the metallurgical report was solely factual material, thus it was not work product
under the Illinois rule. 74 As to the interview memoranda and
notes, the court noted, after an in camera inspection, that with
limited exceptions the interviews contained solely factual information and were not protected work product. 75 The court also
found that one document did contain opinion work product and
ordered that certain material be deleted before production of
the document to Consol. 76 B-E appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court.
66. Id. at 106-07, 432 N.E.2d at 251.
67. The metallurgical report was a notebook which contained mathematical computations, tables, drawings, photographs, industry specification
data, and handwritten notes prepared by an employee of B-E investigating
the excavator's collapse. The legal department at B-E never communicated
with the employee; the report was requested by his supervisor. The report
was transferred to the legal department six months to a year after it was
prepared. Id. at 111-12, 432 N.E.2d at 254.
68. Id. at 107, 432 N.E.2d at 251.
69. The attorneys for B-E conducted oral interviews with various employees of B-E regarding both the manufacture and collapse of the excavator. The substance of the interviews was contained in both typewritten
memoranda and handwritten notes. Id. at 110, 432 N.E.2d at 253.
70. Id. at 107, 432 N.E.2d at 251.
71. Id., 432 N.E.2d at 251-52.
72. Id., 432 N.E.2d at 252. The trial court's ruling on the engineering director's report was not an issue on appeal.
.73. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 93 Ill. App. 3d 35, 44, 416
N.E.2d 1090, 1097 (1980), vacated, 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982).
74. Id. at 41, 416 N.E.2d at 1095. The court held that the report contained
only material and objective information that did not disclose the theories,
mental impressions, or litigation plans of B-E's attorneys. Id.
75. Id. at 42, 416 N.E.2d at 1095. The court found, however, that one document was entirely work product because it contained the attorney's arrangement of the facts. Id.
76. Id. at 42-43, 416 N.E.2d at 1096.
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The Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
Writing for the court, Justice Underwood vacated the appellate court's decision as to the interview memoranda and notes,
while upholding the appellate court as to the metallurgical report. 77 The Illinois Supreme Court held that counsel's interview
memoranda and notes which are not verbatim or verified 78 are
protected opinion work product because they necessarily reveal
in "varying degrees" the attorney's mental process in evaluating
the communications. 79 The court also held that the task of reviewing material, which contains opinion work product mixed
with relevant factual material, in order to excise the protected
material, would place too great a burden on the trial courts. 80
The court went on to hold that, while not routinely discoverable,
opinion work product materials would be discoverable upon a
conclusive showing, by the party seeking discovery, of the absolute impossibility of obtaining necessary information from other
sources. 81 According to the court, the exception was inapplicable to this case because B-E had made available volumes of ma77. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 122, 432
N.E.2d 250, 259 (1982). B-E also argued that the metallurgical report was
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court rejected this argument
because the employee who had prepared the report was not within the
"control group" of the corporation as defined by the court. Id. at 121-22, 432
N.E.2d at 258. For a discussion of the attorney-client privilege as applied to
corporations and the Consolidation Coal opinion in particular, see Johnston, supra note 1, at 14-17. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383 (1981) (rejecting the "control group" test for determining what members of a corporation would enjoy the attorney-client privilege in federal
court litigation).
78. The Consolidation Coal court defined "verified" as the process by
which the interviewee reviews, alters, corrects, or signs the statement taken
by the attorney. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 109, 432 N.E.2d 250, 252-53.
79. Id. at 109, 432 N.E.2d at 253.
80. Id. at 110, 432 N.E.2d at 253.
81. Id. at 111, 432 N.E.2d at 253. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, the Court rejected the "control group" test and
appeared to accept the "subject matter" test. Implications of Upjohn,
supra note 12, at 893. If a corporate employee disclosed to an attorney confidential information related to the subject matter of his employment, the
disclosure would be protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege without respect to the employee's status in the corporate hierarchy.
This decision has important implications for federal work product protection of attorney interviews with employees of corporate clients. The
Upjohn holding makes work product protection for such interview memoranda unnecessary in many instances because it will be absolutely protected by attorney-client privilege.
This is not the case in Illinois. The Consolidation Coal holding, which
embraces the "control group" test, excludes a large portion of corporate client employees from enjoying the attorney-client privilege. Thus, in a corporate client context, work product protection is still a very important
discovery defense in Illinois.
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making
terial which would satisfy Consol's needs, thus
82
discovery of the interview memoranda unnecessary.
ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S POSITION

The Scope of Work Product Protection
The initial issue facing Justice Underwood was whether interview memoranda and notes, which had not been verified by
the witness, were protected work product. In Monier, the court
had only gone as far as to say that memoranda made by counsel
of his impression of a prospective witness were protected work
product. 83 This included any material which contained an attorney's "conceptual data. '84 The appellate and trial courts in Consolidation Coal had read Monier to protect only notes and
memoranda which evaluate a prospective witness. 85 The appellate court reasoned that notes and memoranda which merely
record the responses of the witness were like verbatim statements and thus not protected under Illinois' narrow definition of
86
work product.
Justice Underwood disagreed with this interpretation of
Monier. He instead read Monier in light of Hickman and Upjohn
Co. v. United States.87 In those cases, the United States
Supreme Court had held that memoranda and notes regarding
the oral statements of a witness necessarily reflected, in "varying degrees," the attorney's mental processes in evaluating the
witness' remarks. 88 Such notes and memoranda, although recording factual material, would89 be "permeated" with the attorney's inferences and opinions.
82. "[T]here is nothing which indicates that Consolidation does not al-

ready have or cannot obtain through its attorneys' efforts and depositions
the same factual information that is now included in the form of B-E's attorneys' work product." Id. at 111, 432 N.E.2d at 253-54.
83. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 360, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1966).
84. Id.
App. 3d 35, 42, 416
85. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 93 Ill.
N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (1980), vacated, 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982).

86. "We believe these notes are similar to verbatim statements of witnesses which, in Monier v. Chamberlain, were distinguished from memoranda made by counsel of impressions of prospective witnesses. Monier
held the latter exempt from discovery because they revealed the attorney's

mental processes . . . ." Id.
87. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
88. Id. at 399 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947)).
89. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 109, 432

N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 399-

400).
An attorney's memoranda and notes from witness interviews resist

classification as either opinion work product or ordinary work product. On
the one hand, they contain relevant factual material elicited from the witness during the interview. But on the other hand, they also tend to reveal
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To show the correctness of his assertions, Justice Underwood then turned to the memoranda and notes themselves. The
memoranda in question represented B-E's attorneys' efforts to
review, summarize, and analyze the portions of the interviews
which were important to B-E's case.90 As such, they revealed
the shaping process by which B-E's attorneys arranged the evidence for use at trial. The notes contained a mixture of factual
material and the attorneys' "conclusions, characterizations and
summaries," and thus they, too, were protected work product. 91
Underwood felt that the protection of interview memoranda and
notes, therefore, was within the scope of the Monier decision. 92
Justice Underwood could have ended his inquiry at this
point and ruled that the memoranda and notes were absolutely
protected under Monier and Illinois Supreme Court Rule
201(b) (2). 93 The appellate court, however, had allowed discovery after attempting to excise the protected work product.9
Thus Justice Underwood was forced to address the propriety of
the appellate court's interference in the discovery process in undertaking the excising chore.
the attorney's impression of the witness and his marshalling of facts important to his client's case. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 26.
The federal courts, addressing the issue of whether interview memoranda and notes are opinion work product, have uniformly held that such
materials are opinion work product deserving greater protection from the
discovery process. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399400 (1981) ("Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal
the attorney's mental processes.") (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1979) (memoranda based on oral interviews are opinion work product); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (interview memoranda "may indirectly reveal the
attorney's mental processes, his opinion work product"); Diversified Indus.
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977) (report of interviews with
individuals contains opinion work product); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (court distinguished between verbatim
statements and memoranda summarizing oral interview with witness; latter
held to be opinion work product); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F.
Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Such notes are so much a product of the
lawyer's thinking and so little probative of the witness's actual words that
they are absolutely protected from disclosure."); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (interview memoranda are opinion
work product).
90. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 432 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982).
91. Id.
92. Id. According to the court, such memoranda "reveal the shaping process by which the attorney[s] [have] arranged the available evidence for
use in trial as dictated by [their] training and experience." Id. (quoting
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Il1. 2d 351, 359, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1966)) (citations omitted).
93. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

94. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 93 Ill.
App. 3d 35, 42-43,
416 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (1980), vacated, 89 Ill.
2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982).
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Excising Opinion Work Product From Relevant
FactualMaterial
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's
deletion of protected opinion work product from otherwise factual material based solely on considerations of judicial economy. Justice Underwood felt that in many instances .opinion
work product would be so "inextricably intertwined" with relevant factual material that excising the protected material would
be virtually impossible. 95 To place the burden of reviewing documents on the trial courts would adversely effect the efficient
disposition of litigation. The Monier court had rejected the federal "good cause" test for precisely the same reasons. 96 Allowing such review would also increase judicial intervention
into the discovery process, a problem which Monier sought to
prevent.97 Justice Underwood reasoned that such an intervention would "increase the burden of already crowded court calendars, and thwart the efficient and expeditious administration of
justice .. ."98
What is not clear from the decision is whether the court may
excise opinion work product, where feasible, if the party has
shown the absolute impossibility of procuring the factual material from other sources. The problem becomes one of balancing
judicial efficiency with the need for the unprotected material
and the need to protect the "conceptual data" of an attorney preparing for litigation.
Rejection of Absolute Immunity for Opinion Work Product
After an in camera inspection of the documents in question,
Justice Underwood concluded that in some instances interview
memoranda and notes may be the sole source of relevant factual
material for a party seeking discovery. 99 He reasoned that if
that were the case, then the court could recognize a narrowly
limited exception to the otherwise absolute protection afforded
opinion work product and held that "if the party seeking disclosure conclusively demonstrates the absolute impossibility of securing similar information from other sources," discovery would
2d 103, 110, 432
95. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill.
N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982).
96. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 28.
2d 103, 110, 432 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982). See supra text accompa97. 89 Ill.
nying note 26.
2d 103, 110, 432 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982) (quoting Monier v. Cham98. 89 Ill.
2d 351, 357 (1966)).
berlain, 35 Ill.
99. Id.
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be allowed. 100 Justice Underwood was aware of the Monier
problem of judicial intervention into the discovery process created by the exception. 10 1 He dismissed the proportions of the
problem by contending that the narrowness of the exception
would keep it from being invoked frequently, thus keeping conflicts and judicial intervention at a minimum. 10 2 The problem,
however, is defining absolute impossibility. Even with the admonition that the exception will be rarely used, the court has
given courts and attorneys a new tool which, in the end, can be
used to frustrate both the discovery process and the adversary
system. Attorneys who unjustifiably attempt to invoke the exception could frustrate the Monier ideal that discovery should
be relatively free from judicial intervention. 0 3 The utilization
by the trial courts of such a nebulous standard may lead to erratic application resulting in an attorney being uncertain of the
protection. 0 4 All this could result in an aggravation of the dangers of poorly-served clients and the demoralization of the legal
0 5
system which the work product doctrine seeks to prevent.
Such problems can be resolved by providing clear and certain
instances in which the exception will apply. 0 6 Unfortunately,
the Consolidation Coal court failed to supply the needed
direction.
DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF CONSOLIDATION COAL

As noted previously, the federal courts working under Hickman have developed various approaches and instances in which
opinion work product is discoverable. A close look at these decisions may provide a basis for addressing the problems created
by ConsolidationCoal.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. See supra text accompanying note 26.
104. It can be argued that discovery of opinion work product, by itself,
does not create the problems of deterring written preparation and of poorlyserved clients, but rather it is when such discovery is frequent or erratic,
thus leaving an attorney unsure as to when the work product is protected,
which leads to such untoward results. Discovery of opinion work product,
therefore, must be based on certain and clear guidelines or well-defined exceptions to the rule. See Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, supra
note 12, at 814-15; Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1, at 902-903; Protection of Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 343.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
106. See Protectionof Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 343.
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Excising Opinion Work Product
One unanswered question in the Consolidation Coal decision is whether the trial courts may attempt to excise, where
feasible, protected work product from factual materials where a
party has conclusively shown the absolute impossibility of obtaining the materials from other sources. 10 7 The court's reluctance to allow excision is understandable under the
circumstances presented in that case, but beyond that, such a
rejection appears unreasonable. The reason for the court's rejection can be seen, however, when the federal work product
rule is compared with the Illinois rule.
Under the federal rules and decisions, excision is allowed,
where feasible, upon the requisite showing of substantial need
and undue hardship. 10 8 The showing of substantial need justifies the court taking upon itself the burden of reviewing the material to determine if distillation of the factual material is
feasible. This furthers the goals of discovering relevant factual
material while at the same time protecting opinion work product
from disclosure.
Illinois, on the other hand, does not require a party to show
substantial need in order to compel disclosure of factual material developed by the attorney. Such material is freely discoverable. 0 9 Thus if a party claims that a document prepared by the
attorney for litigation contains solely factual material, no further
showing is required to compel production. In Consolidation
Coal, the appellate court took upon itself the task of excising
the opinion work product without requiring any justification for
assuming the burden."10 At the very least, the party seeking disclosure should have to show difficulty in obtaining the material
from other sources before a court assumes the task of reviewing
possibly thousands of documents, but if the party has conclusively shown the requisite absolute impossibility, it would seem
that the justification for assuming the burden has been met. Excision, where feasible,"' could provide one last barrier for pro107. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
108. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying note 27.

110. Justice Underwood pointed out in his opinion that the material contained within the disputed documents was available both from the other
documents supplied by B-E and also could be obtained by deposition of the
interviewed employees. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 111, 432 N.E.2d 250, 253-54. Thus, even
under FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b) (3), a federal court could not have attempted the
excising chore because the requisite substantial need and undue hardship
would not have been shown. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
111. Feasibility does not depend only on the separability of factual mate-

rial from protected work product. Feasibility can also be determined from
the number of documents which have to be reviewed. Thus if excising
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tecting an attorney's mental impressions and opinions b~fore
allowing discovery. While the Consolidation Coal court's rejection of excision is reasonable in the context of that case, a
wholesale rejection of the approach should not12be maintained if
the party has met the impossibility standard.
The excision approach, however, is not a panacea for the
problem of protecting opinion work product while allowing the
discovery of relevant factual material. 113 As the Consolidation
Coal court noted, in many instances the factual material will be
inseparable from the protected material. 1 4 Thus the problem of
defining the scope of the impossibility standard still remains.
Acceptance of the "At Issue" and Crime or FraudExceptions
The "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions should be accepted by the Illinois courts. Both exceptions require that a
party exhaust all available means of obtaining the information
before discovery is allowed. 1 5 Moreover, the work product
sought under these exceptions is likely to be information peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposing attorney.1 16 Thus
the exceptions fit within the Consolidation Coal impossibility
standards.
The "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions also provide
clear, certain standards under which the courts can operate and
which,would be applicable in very few cases. 117 Because the exceptions, are limited and certain, they would not discourage attorneys from exerting their best efforts or deter written
preparation."l 8 Such effects would be more likely to occur
where discovery of opinion work product was frequent or erratic
because of unclear standards. 1 9 The exceptions, however, relate particularly to pure opinion work product in many cases.
would entail reviewing a large volume of material, a court could rule that
excising is not feasible. This would relieve the concern, expressed in Consolidation Coal, that excising would unduly burden trial courts. See supra
text accompanying note 98.
112. Some federal courts have also allowed the party resisting discovery
to perform the excising task before producing the documents. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1979) (government
agreed to allow corporation under investigation to delete opinion work
product material from deceased employee's interview memoranda). See
also WRIGHT &MILLER, supra note 18, at § 2026 (Supp. 1982).
113. Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1, at 898.

114. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 432
N.E.2d
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

250, 253 (1982).
See supra text accompanying note 51.
See Protectionof Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 343.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also supra note 104.
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That is, the party seeking discovery is trying directly to compel
disclosure of the attorney's opinions and mental impressions
rather than disclosure of relevant factual material which incidentally reveals the attorney's shaping and analysis of the
20
material.
On the other hand, the Consolidation Coal court was concerned with factual material intertwined with protected work
product contained in interview memoranda. 12 1 Therefore, the
Consolidation Coal impossibility standard arguably does not
encompass the two exceptions. Moreover, it is arguable that the
court was aware of the development of these exceptions in the
federal courts 1 22 and could have written the opinion to embrace
these exceptions under the absolute impossibility rule. The exceptions, however, are within the spirit of absolute impossibility
and, as such, should be considered by the Illinois courts as part
of the definition of absolute impossibility.
120. For example, in Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the court held that the attorney's opinion about the
validity of certain patents was at issue in the litigation and thus discoverable. Id. at 931. While it can be argued that the attorney's opinion becomes a
relevant "fact" in the litigation, the party seeking discovery is still attempting to compel the disclosure of the attorney's opinion. In other cases, the
party seeking discovery wants to compel the disclosure of documents which
reveal the attorney's knowledge of the attempt by his or her client to commit a crime or fraud. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977)
(attorney's knowledge of fraud upon U.S. Patent Office); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (attorney's knowledge of client's fraud). These cases can be distinguished from the situation
where a party is seeking to discover relevant factual information contained
in interview memoranda which also tend to reveal the attorney's mental
processes.
The "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions share another common
problem; often the work product sought was developed in previous terminated litigation. This brings into focus the problem of whether to continue
the work product protection in the subsequent action. The federal courts
have developed three approaches to the problem. One view is that the protection does not extend beyond the litigation for which the materials were
prepared. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 119 (M.D. Pa.
1970). Another view is that the work product protection only extends to
related subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alstyne,
Noel &Co., 59 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). A third view is that the protection remains in all subsequent litigation regardless of relatedness. See, e.g.,
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975). See generally Work Product in
Subsequent Litigation, supra note 12; Work ProductImmunity, supra note
12. The Illinois courts have not ruled on this issue. For a discussion of
which direction the Illinois courts are likely to take, see Discovery and Work
Product, supra note 1, at 892.
121. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 432
N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982).
122. Justice Underwood cited Discovery and Work Product,supra note 1,
which discusses the exceptions at length.
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Defining Absolute Impossibility Beyond the "At Issue" and
Crime or Fraud Exceptions
Since the Consolidation Coal court was addressing situations different from the "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions,
Illinois trial courts will be faced with defining other circumstances which constitute absolute impossibility. To foster the
necessary certainty of application, these situations should be
limited to looking at the status of the witness whose statement
is contained in the protected memoranda. Witness availability
and cooperation present two narrow bases upon which absolute
impossibility may be defined. Two federal cases which purport
to use the balancing approach 123 are representative of these two
situations.
In In re GrandJury Investigation,124 the government sought
to compel the disclosure of a corporate attorney's memoranda of
interviews with thirteen employees of a corporation which was
involved in questionable payments to foreign officials. One of
the employees was deceased at the time the government sought
discovery. The Third Circuit held that the interview memoranda discussing the statements of the twelve living employees
were protected opinion work product, 12 5 but allowed the disclosure of the interview memorandum of the deceased employee. 126 The court stated that the "stark inability of the
government to procure the information from any more reliable
127
sources" provided the justification for compelling disclosure.
The death of a prospective witness thus provides a possible
basis for showing absolute impossibility. Other forms of witness
unavailability may also provide a basis for requiring production
of opinion work product, and should include a witness who becomes mentally or physically incapacitated after giving an oral
statement to one attorney, but prior to the opportunity of the
opposing attorney to interview that witness. Absolute impossibility should not include, however, witnesses who are unavailable because of where they reside. Undue hardship may be
proven in that instance, but not absolute impossibility. 128
123. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
124. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
125. Id. at 1232.
126. Id. at 1232-33.
127. Id.
128. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, the
government sought to discover interview memoranda from corporate counsel who had investigated questionable payments to foreign officials. The
government contended that, because the employees who had been interviewed were scattered all over the world, making depositions burdensome,
the burden of showing undue hardship was overcome. Id. at 399. The Court
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A second situation which may create absolute impossibility
is one in which a witness whose information is necessary to a
party's cause refuses to cooperate, or is unable to cooperate,
with the party seeking disclosure. In Xerox Corp. v. IBM
Corp.,129 Xerox brought actions for patent infringement and
misappropriation of trade secrets against IBM. Xerox sought to
discover the interview notes of the IBM attorney who had investigated IBM's possible utilization of Xerox trade secrets. Xerox
sought discovery because in its own deposition of the employees
interviewed by IBM's counsel, the employees claimed to be un13 0
The court
able to recall the information sought by Xerox.
held that the "total inability" of Xerox to obtain material critical
to its case compelled1 the disclosure of otherwise protected opin13
ion work product.
Witness unavailability or lack of witness cooperation are
two situations in which trial courts may find absolute impossibility. Other factors, though, should be considered in determining whether impossibility exists. In In re Grand Jury
Investigation, noted above, the court allowed the discovery of
an attorney's notes from an interview with a deceased witness. 1 32 The court did not, however, consider the possibility that
the necessary information may have been supplied by the
twelve living witnesses who were available for deposition. The
court also did not take into consideration the other materials
supplied by the corporation which may have contained the factual information sought by the government. 133 While witness
availability and cooperation provide bases for discerning absodisagreed and held that, while the government had shown the substantial
need and undue hardship contemplated by FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (3), such a
showing was sufficient to order the disclosure of ordinary work product, but
not the opinion work product embodied in the interview memoranda. Id.
The Court held that the rule required greater protection for opinion work
product. Id. at 400. See also supra note 33. In its simplest terms, the decision demonstrates that, as long as deposition is possible, opinion work product is not discoverable.
129. 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
130. Id. at 375.
131. Id. at 376. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 81 F.R.D. 691, 695
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (interview memoranda of interviews with witnesses hostile
to the party seeking discovery held discoverable without discussion of the
opinion work product implications).
132. See supra text accompanying note 126.
133. There was no discussion by the GrandJury Investigation court as to
the value of the other documents provided to the government except to say
that they had been provided. Moreover, the twelve living employees who
were still available for deposition all had some connection with the questionable transaction. It is not likely that the deceased employee had knowledge of the transaction which the others did not have, and the court gives
no indication that the employee had such unique information to give. In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1228 (3d Cir. 1979).
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lute impossibility, they should only be considered where the factual information sought is peculiarly within the knowledge of
13 4
the unavailable or uncooperative witness.
Another problem which may be encountered by Illinois
courts is whether to allow discovery if the absolute impossibility
arises through the fault of the party seeking disclosure. If an
attorney negligently fails to interview an available witness, and
the witness later dies or becomes incapacitated, should the attorney be allowed to discover the opposing attorney's interview
notes concerning that witness? Allowing discovery would foster
the Monier ideals of ascertaining the truth and expediting the
fair disposition of litigation, but it would also reward an inefficient attorney with the unexpected bonanza of both factual and
opinion work product. In Monier, however, the court held that
finding the truth and streamlining litigation overrode the concern that slothful counsel could take advantage of his diligent
135
adversary.
A final problem in accepting witness availability and cooperation as possible bases for determining absolute impossibility is
certainty. An attorney preparing interview memoranda cannot
predict with accuracy if the witness will later die or claim an
inability to remember the facts. Under the Hickman rationale
for work product protection, the uncertainty of whether such
notes may become discoverable may deter written preparation
134. This requirement makes the suggested situations for determining
absolute impossibility similar to the "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions. See supra text accompanying note 116.
135. An analogous situation arises when a plaintiffs case is involuntarily

dismissed because of the failure of plaintiffs counsel to prosecute or to
comply with the procedural rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). When a court
is considering the propriety of such a dismissal, the issue of the innocent
client comes into focus. That is, should the innocent client suffer for the
negligence or misconduct of his attorney? Predictably, courts deciding this
issue have come to disparate conclusions. Compare Jackson v. Washington
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with Kung v. Fom Inv. Corp., 563
F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977). In Jackson the court stated:
Dismissals for misconduct attributable to lawyers and in no wise to
their clients invariably penalize the innocent and may let the guilty off
scot-free ....
When the client has not personally misbehaved and his
opponent in the litigation has not been harmed, the interests of justice
are better served by an exercise of discretion in favor of the appropriate
action against the lawyer as the medium for vindication ....
Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d at 123-24. But in Kung the
court stated: "Moreover, while it may seem unfair to Kung that the delays

of his attorneys should be visited upon him, litigants are bound by the con-

duct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances which are not present here." Kung v. For Inv. Corp., 563 F.2d at 1318.
While the effects of denying discovery of opinion work product may not
be as drastic as those of involuntary dismissal, in some cases the facts may
be critical to the case and denying discovery on the basis of attorney negligence may severely prejudice a fair result at trial.
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and would discourage an attorney's best efforts on behalf of the
client.' 36 If the trial courts are diligent in limiting discovery to
only those instances where the information sought is solely
within the knowledge of the unavailable or uncooperative witness, however, the discovery of opinion work product will be
would not discourage proper
very rare and as a practical matter
37
preparation by an attorney
CONCLUSION

The purpose of discovery is to allow equal access to relevant
factual material by both sides to a dispute. Clashing with this
purpose is the need of an attorney to work in privacy while preparing for litigation. The work product doctrine was developed
to prevent discovery from becoming a means by which an attorney could operate on the "borrowed wits" of opposing counsel. 138 As such, it provides a qualified immunity from disclosure
of trial preparation materials. The protection is almost absolute
if the materials reflect the attorney's mental impressions or trial
strategy.
In Illinois, the development of the work product doctrine diverged from what is ordinarily assumed to be protected. Illinois
allows free discoverability of relevant factual materials generated from an attorney's preparation for trial, while absolutely
protecting attorney work product which contains conceptual
data. ConsolidationCoal's recognition of a narrow exception to
this absolute protection is a significant change in Illinois law,
and reduces the chances of injustice which absolute immunity
could engender, but the nebulous nature of the exception will
make it hard to apply and confine within narrow bounds.
Acceptance of the "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions
should be immediate, and could be effected by a change in the
Illinois Supreme Court Rules. The trial courts should also accept the unavailable and uncooperative witness problems as
possible bases for determining absolute impossibility. If encouragement of written and adequate preparation is the goal of
the work product doctrine, these suggestions should be adopted
136. See Protection of Opinion Work Product,supra note 5, at 341.

137. Id. at 343. Like the "at issue" and crime or fraud exceptions, the
application of the witness availability and cooperation criteria would not
result in frequent discovery of opinion work product because of the requirements that (1) the witness is totally unavailable or uncooperative, and
(2) the information sought contains facts solely within the knowledge of the
unavailable or uncooperative witness. It is unlikely that a trial court, applying the suggested criteria, would conclusively find both requirements met

in very many cases.
138. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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by the courts to provide clear and certain bounds upon which
attorneys may rely while preparing cases for trial.
Marc O'Brien

